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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the relationship between sport and the Tunisian 
state, focusing on the issues of governance and regulation. Identified 
are three periods: from independence to the coup d’état (20 March 
1956–7 November 1987), where sport was a component of national 
identity; Ben Ali’s regime taking control of the Olympic Movement, 
1987–2011; and Post-2011, which witnessed attempts to achieve 
democracy. Descriptions of the situation in each of the three periods 
are followed by analyses of sports policies (objectives, resources, and 
results), legislation, turning points, and tensions.
Tunisia can be thought of as a ‘promontory’ between its neighbours around the Mediterranean 
and the Sahara Desert, a meeting point of influences from the Middle East, Africa, and 
the Mediterranean. The country was absorbed into the French Empire in 1881 following 
a major financial crisis and did not achieve internal autonomy until 1954. It was finally 
granted full independence in 1956.1 Tunisia’s history since independence can be divided 
into three periods: the Bourguiba years (1956–1987), the Ben Ali years (1987–2011), and 
the ‘transition’ set in motion by the Tunisian revolution, which helped trigger the so-called 
‘Arab Spring’ of 2011 by deposing Ben Ali’s dictatorial regime and making way for a fledgling 
democracy. However, these 60 years of independent government have failed to solve Tunisia’s 
economic, demographic, and social problems, and the country can still be characterized as 
‘underdeveloped’.2 As in many other independent nation states in the Arab world and Africa, 
all of Tunisia’s post-independence leaders have been aware of sport’s value as a component 
of national identity,3 with the result that politics has played a major role in shaping sport.4
In its determination to create a modern society, Tunisia’s first post-independence 
government immediately began defining the country’s geopolitical, cultural, and sporting 
position.5 President Habib Bourguiba quickly realized that sport was an excellent vehicle 
for consolidating and legitimizing the young nation state, thanks to its power in building 
national unity and obtaining international recognition: ‘We need to be present at sports 
competitions, whether Arab, Mediterranean or worldwide … The prestige provided by 
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sporting exploits is undeniable. It rains down on the entire nation’.6 Bourguiba wanted 
Tunisia to become a bridge between East and West. As Ayari noted, ‘compared with the rest 
of the Maghreb, Tunisia’s political orientation can be considered progressive. Polygamy was 
abolished via a Personal Status Code and divorce became legal in 1956’.7
However, in November 1987, Bourguiba was deposed by General Ben Ali, a former 
intelligence specialist and interior minister who Bourguiba had appointed prime minister 
just a month earlier. Ben Ali justified his coup on the basis of Bourguiba’s increasingly 
erratic behaviour, which gave him an excuse to force the former president to step down 
‘for medical reasons’.8 The political system introduced by Ben Ali (1987–2011) was founded 
on three pillars: ‘the Palace, the security apparatus and the president’s family’.9 Indeed, 
‘between 1987 and 2011 this family circle acted like a predator on the Tunisian economy’,10 
and sport was increasingly used as an instrument of political propaganda.11 Ben Ali’s regime 
was eventually toppled in the January 2011 revolution, and Tunisia has been transitioning 
towards democracy ever since.12
In Tunisia, as elsewhere, sport is much more than a codified confrontation between 
two or more players; it is also an inexhaustible source of symbolic and identity capital 
which sporting and/or political leaders readily draw upon.13 Because the state has been 
omnipresent in the history and organization of sport since 1956, sport organizations have no 
independence (appointment of executives by the state, finance provided almost entirely by 
the state, total political control, etc.). This is why the present paper focuses almost exclusively 
on the decisive role and weight of the state in the governance of Tunisian sport, in contrast 
to Western countries, where the relationship between the state and sport tends to be more 
‘balanced’.
Although several authors have investigated these issues in western countries,14 this 
is the first study to examine their specificities in a Maghrebi context. Henry and Lee 
(2004) identified three dimensions of the concept of governance: organizational, political, 
and systemic.15 The organizational dimension concerns the exercise of power within 
organizations, that is, the decision-making and steering mechanisms used to draw up and 
implement policies to improve an organization’s performance and meet its objectives. The 
political dimension concerns the relationship between non-profit organizations and the 
political field, in both senses of the term. This dimension includes the way in which political 
institutions (states, European Union, etc.) try to influence, or even steer, the non-profit sector 
by introducing regulatory mechanisms covering organizations’ finances and ethics, or by 
exerting other forms of political influence. Here, the issue of power is analyzed from an inter-
organizational, rather than an intra-organizational, perspective. The systemic dimension 
covers systems of interdependence, the regulation of inter-organizational relations, and the 
coordination of actions within complex systems. In the case of the sport system, the idea 
of complexity refers to the uncertainty of the environment, the number and diversity of 
stakeholders (public, non-profit, commercial), who often have different interests, and the 
numerous levels of coordination (from local to global). In terms of dynamics, the notion 
of systemic governance indicates the passage from a centralized, hierarchical, and vertical 
method (government) of regulating/coordinating actions to a horizontal approach centred 
round networks based on consensus/compromise and the sharing of power.
The present paper focuses on the political dimension of governance (and its consequences 
on the other two dimensions). It examines the complexity of the sport system and the 
influence of the state in managing and controlling this strategic sector.
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From a theoretical and methodological point of view, a number of researchers have tried 
to understand the relations between ‘sport and the state’ and the structure of national sport 
systems. Most notably, Houlihan suggested that the relations between ‘sport and politics’ 
can be categorized with respect to five components16:
•  The process of sport policy-making.
•  The administrative framework for sport: the responsibilities of central or federal 
governments, state governments, and local authorities.
•  The division of responsibility between different levels of government.
•  How policy-making has addressed the topical problems of drug abuse by athletes.
•  The provision of sport and physical education in schools.
This conceptual framework is mostly used to examine power relations and the way in 
which the sport system is steered.
One of the most comprehensive reviews of different national sport system models was 
provided by Camy et al. as part of the VOCASPORT report commissioned by the European 
Union (2004).17 Henry (2009) subsequently built on this initial research in order to more 
precisely define the different national sport system models and their consequences.18
This framework takes into account four parameters: the first is the role of public 
authorities, specifically the state, as represented by the Ministry responsible for sport; the 
second parameter relates to the level of coordination of, or engagement by, the various actors 
involved in the sport system. This can take the form of a legal framework or simply of a 
de facto prescription of the roles to be played by various actors; the third factor relates to 
the respective roles of the voluntary, public, and private sectors in the delivery of sporting 
provision; the fourth parameter relates to the adaptability of the system to changes in 
demand.
These four parameters give rise to four types of configuration:
•  The ‘bureaucratic configuration’: This is characterized by the very active role that the 
public authorities take in regulating the system. There is almost always a legislative 
framework specific to the field (law on sport). It is a system characterized by rules from 
a public authority which, with its political/democratic legitimacy, does not necessarily 
negotiate to any great extent with other players. The voluntary sports movement acts 
by delegation, social partners are often non-existent, and users/consumers and private 
entrepreneurs have little impact on the implementation of sports policy.
•  The ‘entrepreneurial configuration’: This is characterized by a high level of involvement 
of market forces.
•  The ‘missionary configuration’: This incorporates those states for which the voluntary 
sector acts with delegated powers.
•  The ‘social configuration’: This is characterized by the presence of social partners 
within a multifaceted system.
The absence of market forces rules out the entrepreneurial configuration and, even 
though there is some voluntary sector involvement in Tunisian sport, the dominance of 
the public system rules out the missionary configuration. Finally, the historical absence of 
social partners rules out the social configuration. Hence, the configuration which most 
closely corresponds to the situation in Tunisia is the bureaucratic configuration, albeit with a 
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number of particularities relating to the way power is exercised and the cultural specificities 
of North African countries.
The present paper puts forward the thesis that the sport systems in North African 
countries are subject to a specifically ‘authoritarian’ form of governance that reflects their 
cultures of autocratic and despotic political leadership. This form of leadership has directly 
influenced the largely authoritarian way in which sport is organized and controlled. The 
commercial sports sector (fitness) is almost non-existent, there is little social dialogue, 
and, even more so than in most other countries, power is centralized at a national level, 
with very little delegation to local or regional authorities. Thus, Tunisian sport is run 
according to an interventionist model,19 in which sport is considered a public service and 
the sport movement is controlled by the state via national legislation laid down in the Acts 
of 199420 and 1995.21 Each government chooses the name they wish to give to the body 
responsible for overseeing sport, which may be a ‘ministry, department, commission or 
agency, depending on the country’.22 In Tunisia, successive governments, depending on 
their political orientation, have chosen different names for this body.
Given that Camy et al. focused uniquely on democratic European countries, the objective 
of the present research was to examine the situation in a very different political context by 
conducting an historical analysis of the sport system in a North African nation.
The study was based on the four parameters identified by Camy et al. in 2004,23 adapting 
them to the specificities of the Tunisian sport system, as follows:
•  The role of the public authorities, especially the Minister for Education and the Minister 
for Youth and Sport.
•  The degree of coordination, partnership, and discussion between the different 
stakeholders in the sport system, most notably the national Olympic committee, sports 
federations, and the regional authorities. The promotion of elite sport, on national, 
regional, and local levels, is mostly the remit of the federations. The Olympic committee 
is involved in preparing athletes who have qualified for the Olympic Games. The 
local and regional authorities are involved in encouraging participation in sport and 
exercise. The private sport system tends to be fully independent, working with hotels 
and the tourism sector.
•  The role of sports associations, that is, the Olympic committee and the federations. 
A particularity of this part of this sport system is that up until 2011 one-third of its 
members were appointed (more or less openly) by the state and the president. The 
analysis of the part of the system examined legal and political aspects, as well as 
strategies of influence and control.
•  Adaptability of the system. This is the ability of the system to respond to the demands 
of the market, taking into account the frequent use of sport by political leaders to 
further their own interests. Consequently, public opinion and the requirements of 
stakeholders are rarely taken into account in countries with authoritarian governments.
Consequently, the analysis of the relations between the state and the sport movement 
focused on the first three of these parameters and on elite sport (resources provided, 
exploitation of results, balance of power between executives, etc.), sports events (especially 
international events held in Tunisia), and leisure sport (changes in the types of participants 
and club members). Special attention was also paid to the place of women in sport 
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(participants and executives), as this is an area in which Tunisia had taken a lead compared 
with other developing nations.
Data were collected in the following manner. Initially, the authors:
•  Extracted quantitative data from the annual reports published by the Ministry for 
Youth and Sport (we were able to go back to 1995).
•  Examined relevant legislation via Tunisia’s online archive of national legislation. In 
fact, the current legal framework governing sport in Tunisia is mostly provided by 
two pieces of legislation, namely the Framework Act, no. 95-11 of 6 February 1995, 
relating to sport bodies, and Act no. 94-104 of 3 August 1994, on the organization and 
development of physical education and sports activities.
•  Consulted two key works on the history of Tunisian sport. Both of these works are 
sports sociology doctoral theses that were defended in France and which cover the 
relations between the state and sport in Tunisia. They are ‘Tunisian Sport in a Context 
of Development: A Systematic Approach Followed By a Dialectical Analysis’, defended 
by Taoufik Haouet in 1981, and ‘Archeology of a Political Discourse, Sport and National 
Construction in Tunisia (1956–1985)’, defended by Borhane Erraïs in 1992.
•  Collated information from the work of the Tunisian historian Driss Abbassi, who has 
published extensively on contemporary identity construction phenomena.
As a second stage, five semi-structured interviews with officials from the Tunisian 
Ministry of Youth and Sport (MJS), Tunisia’s national Olympic committee (CNOT), and 
Tunisian sport federations were carried out as follows:
•  Slim Chiboub: Ben Ali’s son-in-law, president of the ‘Espérance Sportive de Tunis’ sports 
club from 1989 to 2004 and president of the CNOT from 2009 to 2011.
•  Mahmoud Hammemi: General Secretary of the CNOT since 2011, general secretary 
of the Union of North African Football Federations since 2011, judge at the Court of 
Arbitration for Sport since 2009.
•  Adel Zeramdini: Director of legal affairs at the MJS from 2005 to 2011, director of 
Shared Services from 2011 to 2012, and private secretary to the Minister of Youth and 
Sport from 2012 to 2014.
•  Chokri Hamda: General secretary of the Observatory of Youth from 2009 to 2012, 
litigation department from 2012 to 2014, general secretary of the Higher Institute for 
Sport and Physical Education from 2014 to 2015, and director of legal affairs at the 
MJS since 2015.
•  Maher Snoussi: Lawyer at the supreme court of appeal, member of the African Football 
Confederation’s legal affairs committee, vice-president of the Tunisian Football 
Federation from 2012 to 2016.
These interviews covered the following themes:
•  Changes in the relationship between the state and the sport and Olympic movements 
from independence to the present (1956–1987, 1987–2011, 2011–2016).
•  Important legislation.
•  Political intervention and the nature of sport policies (elite sport, sport for all, women’s 
sport, sports events).
•  Public finance (direct and indirect).
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•  Sociological aspects (types of sport, participants, clubs, executives).
•  Political interference and its objectives.
•  Dysfunctions in terms of governance and opinion on changes to the electoral system.
We used the above-described theoretical and methodological framework to examine 
the evolution of the bureaucratic configuration in Tunisia and to determine whether the 
political, cultural, economic, and sporting contexts in Tunisia have produced any specific 
particularities. We then looked at how the three parameters considered in our analysis 
evolved during the most recent three stages of Tunisia’s history (from 1956 to 1987, from 
1987 to 2011, post-2011).
From Independence to the Coup D’état (20 March 1956–7 November 1987): 
Sport as a Component of National Identity
It is impossible to understand Tunisia’s attempts to develop sport and physical education 
during the first 30  years of the country’s post-colonial history without considering the 
political importance of sport in nation-building and obtaining international recognition. For 
President Bourguiba, sport was a valuable weapon in the fight against cultural and economic 
underdevelopment, as well as a way of raising Tunisia’s profile on the world stage. Initial 
efforts to promote and cultivate sport were aided by a number of favourable circumstances. 
For example, the consequences of the country’s colonial past, most notably the spread of 
the British sporting model among intellectual circles and a long period of political and 
diplomatic stability, allowed the new nation to set up numerous facilities for young people. 
In addition, the emancipation of women led to profound changes that affected all areas of 
society: polygamy was banned, divorce was made legal, and marriage was made subject to 
the consent of both parties.24 Numerous other rights obtained by Tunisian women at this 
time included the right to vote, granted in 1957. Sports policy during Bourguiba’s 30-year 
presidency can be divided into three distinct periods.
Using Sport to Help Build the New Nation State (1956–1966)
During the colonial period, sport became ‘an instrument in the struggle for independence’ 
through the emergence of ‘indigenous sports associations to rival those of the colonizer’.25 
Once independence had been obtained, sport became a weapon in the fight against 
underdevelopment.26 President Bourguiba’s desire to make sport an important part of society 
and to create a nation that appreciated and played sports reflected his belief that no general 
education could be complete if it did not include a sporting dimension and that sport was 
the best way to shape the nation’s youth and instil a love of country.
As a first step in achieving this objective, on 21 June 1956 he created a Ministry of 
Youth and Sport with its own Secretary of State. The new ministry, which replaced the 
Ministry of Education’s Youth and Sport Department, ensured a degree of autonomy for 
sports policy and showed the government’s commitment to the country’s youth.27 The state,28 
which ‘would play a decisive role in and complete the construction of the nation’,29 further 
consolidated its control over sport by progressively creating other bodies and introducing 
new legislation to reform Tunisia’s sport movement. For example, the Sports Committee 
became the Tunisian Sports Committee on 28 June 1956; the country’s scouting bodies were 
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merged to form the Tunisian Scouts Association on 1 July 1956; the National Institute of 
Sport was founded on1 January 1957; the Tunisian Olympic Committee was set up on 27 
May 1957; the Youth and Sports Department was integrated into the Ministry of Education 
in May 1958; and a Youth and Sports Directorate was created within the President’s Office 
on 8 January 1959. In addition, decrees were published to establish a ‘National Olympic 
Day’ (8 May 1959), to control the activities of sports associations, federations, and groups 
(8 November 1959), to regulate sports betting and create a ‘National Sports Fund’ (27 
January 1960), and to cover the ‘regime of civil sports’ (9 February 1960). Finally, a Higher 
Committee for Youth was set up on 24 February 1961, and a ‘Sports Instructor Training 
School’ was inaugurated in October 1961.
Bourguiba used education and sport as the basis for a number of major initiatives to try 
and transform mentalities in independent Tunisia. Moreover, his speeches regularly referred 
to the role of the state and the importance of controlling the sports sector.30
Efforts to increase the importance of physical activity and sport within society also 
included the Tunisian school system, which underwent a series of major reforms. For 
example, the time allocated to physical education was increased from two hours in 1956 to 
three hours in 1966, with Friday afternoons being set aside for official school competitions. 
Particularly gifted youngsters attended special sports schools that dedicated even more time 
to sport. Bourguiba’s sensitivity to the West’s opinion of Tunisia ensured that women and 
girls were also included in efforts to promote sport. In addition, encouraging girls to take 
up sport at school facilitated the development of leisure sport and elite sport and, within 
just a few years, Tunisian women were achieving excellent results in Arab, African, and 
Mediterranean sports competitions.31
These decisions show that Tunisia was adopting a ‘western model’, especially with respect 
to physical education, where school syllabuses were greatly inspired by the approach used in 
France. However, in contrast to the situation in France, Tunisia did not create the conditions 
in which sport could grow, especially with respect to sports facilities, school and university 
sport, competitive sport, and leisure sport.32
As he noted on 30 September 1960, Bourguiba considered sport to be a way of ‘improving 
the physical, intellectual and moral condition of an individual and of the people’.33 
Consequently, the MJS drew up a policy to encourage people of all social classes to take 
up sport and an action plan to help the elite sportspeople that would emerge from this 
wide sporting base. The only way these objectives could be achieved was through state 
intervention.34 The Minister of Sport introduced standard statutes for sport federations 
and clubs, laying down rules for how they could be formed and run. To ensure all the 
different federations were fully integrated into Tunisian sport, and in order to set up a 
programme for preparing and helping elite sportspeople, highly qualified technical directors 
were appointed to federations.35 Furthermore, the MJS introduced three measures to help 
Tunisia’s elite sportspeople move up to a higher level: it set up a national coaching school 
(four-year study programme), it drew up a new training programme for coaches, and it 
provided federations and clubs with highly qualified coaches who would encourage sport 
at all levels throughout Tunisia, pick and train regional teams, and orient and improve the 
existing framework. In addition, the MJS covered the cost of paying coaches, provided 
substantial subsidies in the form of financial and material resources, and allowed clubs to 
obtain sponsorship from companies.
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Hence, the government’s actions during this period focused both on building reliable 
administrative and legislative structures and on sports policy, training executives, setting 
up structures for elite sport, and sending envoys to international sporting bodies to ensure 
the national team was invited to international sports events and to obtain positions within 
these bodies. Tunisia first took part in international competitions in 1957, at the Festival 
of Sports and at the third Pan-Arab Games in Beirut, and in 1960 the country’s soccer 
team competed in the first edition of the Africa Cup of Nations in Accra. In the light of the 
honourable results achieved by Tunisian athletes at these events, the government decided 
to send teams to more prestigious events such as the Mediterranean Games in Beirut (1959) 
and the World Military Boxing Championships in New Jersey (1961).
An Important Tool for Increasing the Young Nation’s International Profile and 
Reputation (1967–1977)
For Tunisia’s government, sport was a precious ally in the fight against cultural and 
economic underdevelopment; it was the road that would facilitate Tunisia’s entry into 
the international sphere. This ‘political strategy’ was crowned by the success of Tunisian 
athletes at international competitions in the 1960s (e.g. Mohammed Gammoudi won silver 
in the 10,000 metres at the 1964 Tokyo Olympics and gold in the 5,000 metres at the 1968 
Mexico City Games). The government relied heavily on international sporting success and 
on the hosting of major sports events to raise the country’s sporting and political profiles 
around the world. By hosting several ‘second tier’ international events, such as the World 
Military Cross-Country Championships in 1966 and the Maghrebi Boxing and Gymnastics 
Championships in 1968, the country was able to demonstrate its organizational abilities and 
show how it was progressing as a modern country open to the outside world. The sporting, 
spectator, and media successes of these events resulted in Tunisia being chosen to host the 
1967 Mediterranean Games. This event, held in the newly built National Olympic Complex, 
the ‘pride of an entire nation’, and involving 12 countries, was the culmination of a phase 
notable for its ‘Exemplary Tunisia’ plan.36 It was also the first edition of the event to include 
female athletes. Bouabdallah Beya, a great sporting all-rounder,37 and a pioneer of women’s 
sport in Tunisia, provided her country with its first women’s medals.38 At the end of the 
Games, Tunisia was ranked sixth in the medals table with five gold, nine silver, and 11 bronze 
medals. Morocco was eighth with five medals, followed by Algeria with three medals. The 
exploits of Tunisia’s women athletes continued throughout the 1970s, culminating with 
victory in the 1976 African Women’s Handball Championships in Algiers.
Bourguiba’s objective in hosting international competitions, especially the Mediterranean 
Games, was to show off Tunisia as an enterprising, dynamic, and emancipated nation. The 
country’s emergence into the world of international sport was confirmed by the creation 
of the Tunisian National Olympic Committee (CNOT), whose members were drawn from 
the national sport federations that had been set up by the government to replace the pre-
independence system of sports leagues. The CNOT was founded on 27 May 1957, when the 
Tunisian Athletics Federation invited representatives of the country’s 17 sport federations 
to a meeting at which they elected the committee’s first Executive Board. On 23 September 
1957, in Sofia, Bulgaria, the International Olympic Committee (IOC) Session officially 
recognized the new NOC, allowing Tunisia to participate in competitions organized under 
the IOC banner. However, Tunisia’s quest for international recognition was more ambitious 
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than merely competing in major competitions; it also wanted to have a voice within 
international bodies. Tunisia’s first international sports administrator and spokesperson was 
Mohamed Mzali, who Bourguiba, once again exerting his power over the sport movement,39 
had had ‘elected’ to the presidency of the CNOT (1962–1986). Mzali now held the three 
most powerful jobs in Tunisian sport – the politico-administrative post of Director of 
Sports and two representational posts as president of the CNOT (1962–1986) and president 
(1962–1963) and then vice-president (1963–1967) of the Tunisian Football Federation. 
These positions allowed him to implement Bourguiba’s sports policies within Tunisia and to 
promote these policies around the world. As president of the CNOT, Mzali had access to the 
highest echelons of international sports administration, becoming a member of the IOC in 
1965, a member of the IOC’s Executive Board in 1973, and then vice-president (1976–1980) 
and president of the International Committee of the Mediterranean Games (1979–1987).40 
Tunisia’s National Olympic Day, created in 1959 in order to instil the sporting spirit among 
the country’s youth, was another element in this quest for Olympic recognition.41
However, this period was also marked by political instability at the head of Tunisian 
sport, with the MJS being led by seven different ministers, each with his own political 
agenda. For example, one minister, who was known for his authoritarian stance, used crowd 
trouble at a football match between Espérance Sportive de Tunis (EST) and Sportif de Sfax 
on 13 June 1971, as an excuse to dissolve the Tunisian Football Federation, the EST football 
club, and its fan club. Even though the large number of medals won by Tunisian athletes 
during this period gave the impression that Tunisian sport was in good health, it was 
subject to perpetual political interference from a directive and authoritarian government 
that attempted to exercise its control by appointing carefully selected people to the boards of 
sports associations and federations.42 In fact, because government policy focused so heavily 
on using prestige sport to serve its political interests, the overall situation of Tunisian sport 
at this time was not as ‘educational’ as the government tried to make out. For example, at 
the end of 1977, Tunisia’s sport federations had just 46,476 registered athletes, that is, 0.77% 
of the country’s population or 1.05% of under-35s. Most of these registered athletes (57%) 
were in just five regions (Sousse, Nabeul, Monastir, Bizerte, and Kairouan), while none of 
Tunisia’s other 10 regions had more than 1,700 registered athletes.43
In addition, financial support for sport was heavily concentrated in the capital region. 
For example, during the period 1962–1971, 4,460,000 dinars (1,980,500 euros), out of a total 
budget of 6,213,000 dinars (2,759,000 euros), were spent building the National Olympic 
Complex in Tunis for the 1967 Mediterranean Games, while only 1,753,000 dinars (778,500 
euros) were allocated to the country’s regions. To give some perspective, in 1977 Tunisia’s 
per capita GDP was approximately 792 euros, compared with 6,860 euros in France.44 The 
end of the Bourguiba regime would herald the beginning of a new period in Tunisian sport.
Sport as a Tool for Calming Social Unrest (1978–1987)
The decade from 1978 to 1987 was a highly turbulent period for the Bourguiba government. 
On 26 January 1978, a major breakdown in the relationship between the state and the 
people led the Union Générale Tunisienne du Travail (UGTT) to call the first general strike 
since the country’s independence. This strike triggered an uprising against Bourguiba’s 
government in which thousands of demonstrators assaulted ministries and public buildings 
across the capital. A total of 51 people were killed.45 This social unrest coincided with a 
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meeting of the IOC’s Executive Board in Tunis, which Mohamed Mzali had hoped would 
show international sport’s top executives a positive image of Tunisia and the young nation’s 
achievements in the field of youth and sport.46 Nevertheless, Bourguiba’s attempts to shield 
sport from the problems within Tunisian society and continue its development were given a 
huge boost by the Tunisian football team, which, for the first time in the country’s history, 
qualified for the World Cup finals, due to take place later that year in Argentina. On hearing 
the news, the Tunisian people once again took to the streets, this time in a celebratory mood. 
Barely two months had passed since the riots, but the football team’s exploit had given the 
entire country a huge boost and helped calm the people’s anger.
However, the gulf between the regime and the nation continued to deepen and by 1979 
the government realized it would have to do more to improve its legitimacy. One of its 
responses was to send the Minister for Youth and Sport on a tour of the country to highlight 
the government’s efforts and successes in developing school sport, children’s clubs, sport-
study classes, leisure sport, and sports infrastructure. Sport had become an important card 
in saving the state and demonstrating the government’s efficacy.
Following this succession of social crises, and in order to achieve a new balance, Bourguiba 
made Mohamed Mzali, Tunisia’s leading sports administrator, his new prime minister in 
1980. However, decisions by the new government’s Minister for Youth and Sport increased 
the exodus of Tunisian coaches to other Arab countries.47 The resulting lack of top-class 
coaches resulted in the national football team repeatedly failing to qualify for the World 
Cup Finals (until 1998) and Olympic Games (until 1988).48
By 1984 the country was once more in crisis,49 and, again, the Minister for Youth and 
Sport used sport to reduce tensions, referring in his speeches to the importance of preserving 
the sporting ethic from threats such as regionalism and fanaticism, and the need to cultivate 
patriotic feelings among all Tunisians, especially the young. Mzali, in his role as ‘Olympic 
philosopher’, invited Tunisian society to meditate on the values of Olympism and to adopt 
its ethic. His speeches during this period frequently referred to Olympism and he even set 
up a conference entitled ‘The contribution of Olympism to international understanding 
and peace’, held in July 1984.
Ben Ali’s Regime Takes Control of the Olympic Movement, 1987–2011
The destitution of President Bourguiba on 7 November 1987 marked the end of the 
population’s support for Tunisia’s first president and of the first stage in the building of a 
nation state.50 The second phase brought new perspectives, new rules, new aims, and a new 
president who had to demonstrate his legitimacy.
The crisis afflicting Tunisia’s economy in the early 1980s had resulted in the International 
Monetary Fund and World Bank pressurizing the government to reduce the state’s role in 
the economy and introduce market-based mechanisms. As a result, Tunisia began a long 
process of liberalization that affected every aspect of expenditure. Government departments, 
including those responsible for sport, saw large cuts being made to their budgets. In addition, 
sport organizations, which had developed within a public and interventionist environment, 
had to adapt their governance and legislation to new international standards. Tunisia’s second 
president, Zine el Abidine Ben Ali, made extensive use of sport to promote and legitimize his 
regime, but sport as a whole suffered from the regime’s despotic management and narrow 
focus. In fact, between 1987 and 2011, Ben Ali’s family circle51 ‘acted like a predator on the 
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Tunisian economy … In order to control society, this bureaucratic-patrimonial complex 
used organizations, bodies and networks to keep a close watch on the population and adopt 
a clientilist approach to distributing material and symbolic resources’.52
Using International Events to Demonstrate the Regime’s Legitimacy
After seizing power, Ben Ali and his allies reassured the opposition and the Tunisian people 
of their good intentions by taking a series of liberal and constitutional measures (release 
of political prisoners, abolition of lifetime presidents, etc.). At the same time, they made 
their first moves to extend their control over the political scene and consolidate their power 
(removal of executives who vaunted the virtues of democracy, reminders to journalists and 
editors that certain lines should not be crossed, etc.). Tunisia was turning a new political and 
ideological corner, although sport continued to be seen as an essential vehicle for building 
feelings of belonging and identification and sport was extensively used to promote the 
country’s new multi-layered identity (Mediterranean, African, Maghrebi, and Muslim). One 
of the ways the new government did this was by staging major sports events, which could 
be invested with great political, financial, and symbolic meaning. This policy’s success in 
legitimizing the regime and raising Tunisia’s international profile is reflected in the large 
number of events the country hosted during the 24 years of Ben Ali’s reign, including the 
Africa Cup of Nations in 1994 and 2004, the 2001 Mediterranean Games, the 2005 World 
Handball Championships, and numerous African, Maghrebi, and Arab Championships in 
sports such as athletics, judo, and swimming.53
The Tunisian authorities used the opening ceremonies for international sports events 
to demonstrate Tunisia’s historic roots (Carthaginian, African and Mediterranean) and to 
highlight the figure 7, which symbolized the new political regime that emerged from the 
events of 7 November 1987, and which was displayed everywhere (in the names of stadiums, 
on advertising posters, etc.). Ben Ali used these events to promote his efforts to help young 
people and develop sport. For example, two weeks after launching the 2001 Mediterranean 
Games, the president invited everyone involved to the Mediterranean Games Village in order 
to thank them for their hard work and, most importantly, to announce rewards for gold, 
silver, and bronze medal winners of 100,000 dinars (44,500 euros), 75,000 dinars (33,500 
euros), and 50,000 dinars (22,300 euros), respectively (Tunisia’s per capita GDP in 2001 was 
approximately 2,087 euros, compared with 20,565 euros in France).54 This announcement 
was praised by the entire Tunisian sporting community, which won a total of 59 medals at the 
Games (19 gold, 13 silver and 27 bronze), placing it 6th out of the 23 participating nations.
Hosting major sports events also helped raise Tunisia’s international profile. The Tunisian 
authorities wanted to export an image of a modern nation state that was open to the outside 
world. This modernity could be seen both in media coverage of the events, which made 
extensive use of new technologies, and in the acclaim given to women athletes. Hence, as 
well as boasting of having the only capital city to have hosted the Mediterranean Games 
on two occasions and of staging the first edition of the Games to feature 23 nations and 23 
sports, Tunisia used the 2001 Mediterranean Games to show itself as a truly emancipated 
country. Tunisia’s proud history of encouraging participation by female athletes had begun 
at the 1967 Mediterranean Games, the first edition of the event to include women from the 
Maghreb.55 The 2001 edition was used to build on this legacy by adding women’s events in 
three new sports (rowing, wrestling, and weightlifting). This aim was helped by the dazzling 
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performance of Tunisia’s women’s team, which won 18 medals (six gold, one silver, and 11 
bronze), a result that was presented as proof of the success of the Tunisian Government’s 
policies in promoting sexual equality and in improving the lot of women in general and of 
sportswomen in particular.56
In the world of football, Tunisia’s performances in the Africa Cup of Nations had varied 
from a humiliating first-round exit at home in 1994 (eliminated by Mali) to reaching the 
final on two occasions, in 1965 (beaten by Ghana, at home) and in 1996 (beaten by the hosts 
in South Africa). The Tunisian team finally made history by winning the tournament in 
2004, when they delighted the home crowd by beating Morocco in the final. This sporting 
success was quickly turned into a political victory and a vindication of Ben Ali, the ‘Man 
of November 7’. To the immense satisfaction of the Tunisian authorities, the positive image 
it gave of the country was relayed by a number of political and sporting figures around 
the world.57 In fact, international events were part of the government’s electoral strategy, 
supported by mainstream and political clientilism in the provision of sporting subsidies, 
which it used to increase its electoral base and political power.58 This, combined with a 
major media effort, is why ‘the performances of Tunisian athletes in 2001 and the national 
football team’s victory in the 2004 Africa Cup of Nations provided Ben Ali with the glory 
and prestige Bourguiba (1956–1987) never enjoyed’.59
Between Despotism and Prejudice
It is important to note that Ben Ali implemented his policies through the bureaucracy set up 
by Bourguiba. Although neither regime was democratic,60 the two systems of government 
were very different. Ben Ali’s government was characterized by secrecy and the establishment 
of a police state which tried to control every aspect of Tunisian life, including sport.
The State’s Stranglehold on Sport
According to Chouikha and Gobe, ‘Up until the beginning of the 2000s, Ben Ali’s regime 
introduced a series of institutional reforms in order to establish a tightly controlled system 
that would ensure the continuation of the authoritarian regime … Their aim was to reward 
party leaders and organizations which had shown allegiance to the government’.61 The results 
of this for ordinary Tunisians was a decline in government services and an all-pervasive 
monitoring of every aspect of daily life by the police and security services.62 Regime loyalists 
controlled every important organization in the country, including its sport organizations, 
which were supposed to be neutral, democratic, and non-governmental, but which, in 
reality, were run by executives chosen by the political police and approved by the ruling 
party.63 The result was inequality, favouritism, fraud, and corruption.64
These practices intensified during the final years of the Ben Ali regime due to marginalizing 
and oppressive governance by Tunisian sport’s two top administrators. The first, Abdelhamid 
Slama, was Ben Ali’s advisor on culture, youth, and sport (as well as president of the CNOT 
from 2004 to 2009). He was appointed Minister of Sport at the beginning of January 2011, 
just a few days before the revolution. The second, Slim Chiboub, was Ben Ali’s son-in-law 
and Abdelhamid Slama’s successor as president of the CNOT (2009–2011). Chiboub was 
also president of a major sports club and an influential figure in the world of sport.65
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During the early years of Ben Ali’s regime, the CNOT had continued to enjoy a degree 
of independence and an internationalist stance. However, the regime gradually tightened 
its control over the CNOT, first by imposing new statutes, drawn up by Slama in 1991 in 
his role as commissioner general for sport, and then through the appointment of Ben Ali’s 
son-in-law as president in 2009.
Questionable Public Finances
In general, ‘sport owes its rise to federal power’.66 Nevertheless, federal power is currently 
facing new challenges created by new social, economic, and political realities, both nationally 
and internationally. Moreover, although the public authorities and private investors provide 
both commitment and financial support, they are also competitors for control over the 
sector. In fact, when sport federations are made responsible for running a public service, 
the state can control management procedures and the way in which federations carry out 
their missions by imposing a strict legislative and regulatory framework.
The largest source of public finance for Tunisian sport during the Ben Ali period was 
the MJS, which provided an estimated 21 million dinars (approximately 9 million euros) 
in subsidies. Extra finance was provided by local authority subsidies (9 million dinars/4 
million euros in 2009, excluding sports facility maintenance), the National Fund for Youth 
and Sport (FNPJS, 10 million dinars/4.5 million euros for the 2008–2009 season), and 
other public sources, such as broadcasting rights from the state television company FTF 
and donations from publicly owned companies.
The FNPJS, now known as Promosport, was set up by the government in 1979 to help 
sports clubs cover their operating costs and provide a safety net against any future economic 
problems.67 Supposedly financed uniquely by a lottery based on the final classification of 
non-amateur football leagues, its receipts for 2010 are estimated to have been 35 million 
dinars (15.6 million euros). Receipts were divided among the various parties as follows: 
50% to the MJS to provide subsidies for clubs and sports associations (20% of which were 
paid directly to the ‘treasury of the presidential palace’), 40% to the lottery winners, and 
10% to the company responsible for running the lottery.68 Nevertheless, the distribution of 
subsidies during the Ben Ali years was highly contestable.
Because subsidies were based on membership numbers, clubs and associations would 
sometimes swell their ranks by recruiting ‘ghost’ members, most of whom would never 
be seen, in order to get the largest possible subsidy. In addition, clubs with well-placed 
contacts would use them to obtain preferential treatment, so the allocation of subsidies 
was rarely equitable.
Another problem was the lack of resources available for individual and women’s sports 
due to the decision to specialize in certain ‘targeted’ sports, chosen on the basis of previous 
results. Targeted sports received privileges that were not accorded to other sports, including 
a substantial budget, sufficient training camps to meet the needs of elite athletes, and top-
quality coaching. In contrast, non-targeted sports did not receive enough resources to 
implement effective development plans and therefore continued to be losers in the system.
For many years, sports associations relied heavily on state subsidies to meet their ever-
increasing financial needs, as finance was kept exclusively public in order to ensure sport 
remained open to all and to nurture Tunisia’s image. The government also wanted to 
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maintain its control over sport and create a breeding ground for elite athletes capable of 
competing at the highest national and international levels.
In such an environment, and with these sports policies, the federations, which rely on 
volunteers, began considering how they could change the way they were run in order to 
adapt to these new socioeconomic realities.
Inconsistencies in the Regime’s Sports Policy
A number of criteria can be used to differentiate between a true sport policy and a group of 
measures implemented sporadically and with no overall cohesion.69 According to Mény and 
Thoenig (1989), ‘analysis of a public policy should reveal: (1) a general framework for action; 
(2) an explicit definition of the goals or objectives to be met as a function of standards and 
values; (3) a collection of concrete measures that form the substance and foundation of the 
policy; (4) the people at whom the policy is aimed; (5) a decision-making mechanism for 
allocating resources and/or drawing up regulatory measures’.70 Failure to include all these 
elements in a sport policy can lead to failings, disparities, and discrimination.
The unfairness of the government’s policy affected all areas of sport. A large geographical 
disparity arose in the numbers of people doing sport, as more than 60% of regular 
participants, both boys and girls, and almost 46% of sports associations (between 2008 and 
2009) were concentrated in Tunisia’s eight coastal governorates (the country is divided into 
24 governorates). Low participation rates in some regions were the result of the school sport 
system, as some sports declined in popularity because they were no longer done at school 
and because they received little support from the state. For example, between 1992 and 2002, 
there were substantial falls in the number of school athletes in non-targeted sports such as 
swimming (from 1028 to 383), gymnastics (from 1337 to 897), and table tennis (from 328 
to just 39), with a corresponding rise in numbers competing in targeted sports such as judo 
(from 1058 to 2374). In fact, Tunisia’s performance-centred sporting model was unsuited 
to the country’s economic and constitutional characteristics and therefore bound to fail in 
terms of developing sport as a whole. Furthermore, the focus on prestige, the absence of 
suitable structures for other aspects of sport, and the lack of human and financial resources 
meant that the national sport system continued to be excessively tilted in favour of elite sport 
at the expense of other areas of sport, such as sport for health and leisure sport.
Women’s Sport as Proof of Success
At this time, women’s sport was constantly presented as tangible proof of women’s 
emancipation in Tunisia and, most importantly, of the support given to women and 
women’s sport, most notably by the president’s wife, Leila Ben Ali. As a result, the number 
of registered women players increased from 10,978 to 27,449 between 2000 and 2007, 
although the provision of subsidies to organizations with large numbers of women members 
means that these figures, too, may have been falsified. Tunisia’s 775 elite sportswomen 
were responsible for 42% of the medals won by Tunisian athletes in major international 
competitions, including three world championships. However, sportswomen accounted for 
only 15% of the country’s registered athletes, as sports clubs never had more than 12,000 
female athletes, 4,000 of who played one of four team sports. The remaining 8,000 female 
athletes were spread across another 20 sports, which means that, on average, each sport 
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and each federation had just 400 female members covering all age groups. At the school 
and university levels, there were 33,000 registered sportswomen (0.2% of women and girls 
in education), compared with 73,000 sportsmen; hence, women accounted for only 30% 
of student sportspeople.71
Post-2011: Attempts to Achieve Democracy
The ‘revolution’ of 14 January 2011 affected every area of Tunisian life, including sport. 
Ben Ali’s despotic regime had dominated sport for 23 years by ensuring people close to 
the regime controlled every important sport organization. To remedy this situation, on 14 
July 2011, a ministerial decree was published (Decree-Act no. 2011-66 modifying Organic 
Law no. 95-11 of 6 February 1995),72 requiring all Tunisia’s national sport federations to 
elect new executive boards by calling special elective general assemblies and allowing them 
to replace the standard statutes imposed by the previous government with new statutes of 
their own devising. This decision was welcomed across Tunisia’s sporting system, although 
the removal of the government’s ‘direct’ influence required federations to make profound 
changes to their governance, especially its political dimension.
However, in order to maintain a degree of control over the federations, the Minister for 
Sport retained article 21 of Organic Law no. 95-11 of 6 February 1995, which states:
The minister responsible for sport may, in the case of management failures or mismanagement, 
end the activities of one, several or all the members of an executive board via a ministerial order 
explaining the reasons underlying the decision. If the activities of at least half the members 
of an executive board are ended, the minister for sport may appoint an interim board whose 
responsibilities will include calling a general meeting within a period not exceeding three 
months from the date of the order.
Since the revolution, this article has been used to dissolve 10 sport federations,73 for 
reasons including failure to hold an elective general assembly as required by Decree-Law 
no. 66/2011, resignation of more than a third of the executive board’s members, dissolution 
of the executive board following a decision by the National Sports Arbitration Committee, 
and administrative and financial mismanagement. However, in two cases, appeals by the 
national federation to its international federation have been upheld, thereby annulling the 
dissolution order. This was the case for the Tunisian Athletics Federation, whose appeal was 
heard by the International Association of Athletics Federations, and the Tunisian Boxing 
Federation, which appealed to the International Boxing Association.
Today, the Tunisian sports movement is managed by two groups of stakeholders who 
jointly organize, manage, and promote sport. One group consists of public authorities, 
represented by the state, the relevant government ministry, which is subject to great political 
instability,74 and its local representatives (a regional Youth and Sport Commission in each 
of Tunisia’s 24 governorates). The other group consists of private entities, represented by the 
sport movement (1,400 associations, including 87 women’s associations and 47 federations) 
and the Olympic movement, represented by the CNOT. The budget allocated to the MJS 
for 2016 was 555,904,000 dinars (225,500,000 euros), compared with 501,722,000 dinars 
(204,000,000 euros) for 2015.
As 2016 was an Olympic year, in addition to the 23-million-dinar (9,350,000-euro) 
budget allocated by the MJS to elite sport, the government provided a further 2,282,000 
dinars (928,000 euros). This budget was managed by the ad hoc commission set up to 
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prepare for the Olympic Games, which consisted of representatives from the MJS and the 
CNOT. At the Rio Olympics, Tunisia won three bronze medals, two for the women’s team 
(Ines Boubakri in fencing and Maroua el Amri in wrestling) and one for the men’s team 
(Oussama Oueslati in taekwondo).
Conclusion
Since independence, the state has been intimately involved in organizing, running, and 
financing sport. Consequently, the responsibilities of the different stakeholders within the 
sport system have been diluted.
The analysis shows that Tunisia’s post-independence sport system has been run according 
to an authoritarian, bureaucratic, government-controlled model, but with important 
differences between the three main periods in the country’s recent history. The initial version 
of the model, instigated by Bourguiba, was intended to help build national identity and to 
ensure a place for Tunisia on the world’s sporting stage. Under Ben Ali, the model evolved 
into a ‘clientilist system’ designed to protect the status quo and help the powers retain 
their control over all areas of public and commercial activity. Nevertheless, both periods 
were characterized by strict state supervision and even indoctrination of the stakeholders 
involved in sport. Since the revolution in 2011, the Tunisian sport system has become more 
‘fragmented’ as attempts are made to move towards a more democratic model.
This authoritarian, bureaucratic model differs from the bureaucratic model defined by 
Henry,75 in that it is built on interventionist sports legislation where ‘the promotion and 
the development of sport are considered public services provided by the sports movement, 
controlled, to a greater or lesser extent, by the state’.76 In Tunisia, government control is 
particularly strict, as sports federations must apply for government recognition (from 
the appropriate ministry), adopt standard statutes, and follow set operating procedures. 
Furthermore, state intervention has led to the sport system being dominated by people close 
to the government, a form of indoctrination and clanism. Finally, this model places much 
greater importance on trustworthiness and faithfulness to the regime, than on the processes 
and procedures described by Henry.77 Given the links between the Tunisian Government’s 
tight control over sport and the country’s political system and culture, we would expect 
the authoritarian, bureaucratic model to also occur in other North African countries with 
similar characteristics, but further research is needed to confirm this.
The deterioration in the structure and organization of Tunisian sport since the 2011 
‘revolution’, due to recent governments not considering sport a central element in the new 
Tunisian state, has led some people to begin lamenting the passing of the previous regime. 
The difficulties and dysfunctions described in this paper raise the question of how the state’s 
current involvement in sport can be adapted to suit the new political context.
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